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RESOLVING "CUSTODIAL" IN CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION PERTAINING TO MIRANDA
WARNINGS: THE BALANCE BETWEEN
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND POLICE
EFFECTIVENESS
The D.C. Circuit has thus far declined to reach the question of
whether a defendant isin "custody" for the purposes of Miranda when she
ishandcuffed during the execution of a search warrant. Other Circuits are
split on whether handcuffing during the course of a search generally
renders a defendant in "custody"for the purposes of Miranda.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

The heart of the Bill of Rights contains some of the most crucial
and important rights granted to American citizens. 2 Specifically, the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments, the right to remain silent and the right to counsel,
are widely recognized but sometimes misunderstood.3 Ordinary American
citizens are familiar with Miranda warnings from fictitious television
programs; however it has become increasingly difficult to determine when
these warnings are mandatory or when they require invocation.4 The
circuits unanimously require Miranda warnings prior to "custodial
interrogations" because there is a formal arrest; however they are split
when defining "custodial" in other situations of police detainment. One of

I

United States v. Richardson, 36 F. Supp. 3d 120, 129 n.9 (D.D.C. 2014).
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing protection against self-incrimination); U.S. CONST.
amend. VI (providing right to counsel); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 91, 121-22 (1908)
("[T]he principle that no person could be compelled to be a witness against himself [is] embodied
in the common law and distinguished it from all other systems of jurisprudence. It was generally
regarded then, as now, as a privilege of great value, a protection to the innocent though a shelter
to the guilty, and a safeguard against heedless, unfounded or tyrannical prosecutions.").
3 See Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Standing Mute at Arrest as Evidence of
Guilt: The "Right to Silence" Under Attack, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 1-4 (2007) (describing
confusion that exists among citizens about the Fifth Amendment); Michael J. Kelly, Note,
Making Farettav. California Work Properly: Observations and Proposalsfor the Administration
of Waiver of Counsel Inquiries, 20 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 245, 245-51 (2005)

(invoking right to counsel and how lay people may not be aware).
4 See Ronald Steiner, et al., The Rise and Fallof the Miranda Warnings in Popular Culture,
59 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 219, 221 (2011) (arguing citizens knowledge of warnings are misconstrued
from media).
5 See e.g., Richardson, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 129 n.9 (identifying D.C. Circuit failing to answer
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the many legal tests requires an objective analysis of the suspect, yet these
tests frequently result in inconsistent outcomes throughout different
jurisdictions.6
Throughout the early construction of American law, the founding
fathers consistently fought to include the right to counsel and the protection
against self-incrimination because they sought to avoid coercion and forced
admissions of guilt which was prevalent within English common law.
Throughout time, these rights were molded and contoured to adapt to
modern times and contemporary jurisprudence.8
Pre-Miranda court
decisions either approved of (expressly or constructively) or looked the
other way from police misconduct and coercion, but that slowly changed
over time. 9 Miranda v. Arizona 0 brought these issues to the forefront in
the mid-twentieth century and forced police to adopt new procedural
requirements informing individuals of their rights during custodial
interrogations.1 1 Currently, the law is in a state of confusion pertaining to
the meaning of "custodial." 12 There is no doubt when an individual is
placed under formal arrest, either pursuant to probable cause or an arrest

whether handcuffs during search require Miranda warnings); see also United States v. BrinsonScott, 714 F.3d 616, 621 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (finding lawful arrest but passing on constitutional
question of custody under Miranda); United States v. Harris, 515 F.3d 1307, 1311 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (finding violation of Fifth Amendment was "harmless" and refusing to analyze custody
issue); United States v. Gaston, 357 F.3d 77, 87-88 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (avoiding custody question
by implementing "administrative exception" under Miranda); United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d
1286, 1290 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding defendant placed in handcuffs during detention was not in
custody within meaning of Miranda). But see United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109-10
(4th Cir. 1995) (finding handcuffs are important factor to consider but not dispositive within
custody analysis); United States v. Cowan, 674 F.3d 947, 957-58 (8th Cir. 2012) (concluding
suspect did not objectively feel free to terminate encounter and questioning); United States v.
Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 676 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[A] reasonable person finding himself placed in
handcuffs by the police would ordinarily conclude ... that he was restrained to a degree normally
associated with formal arrest and, therefore, in custody.").
6 See Newton, 369 F.3d at 672, 676 (identifying "objective" test for custody whether
individual "feels free to end the encounter" with police); see also Brinson-Scott, 714 F.3d at 621
(holding use of handcuffs is important factor, but not dispositive).
7 See RICHARD L. GREAVES, SOCIETY AND RELIGION IN ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND, 649, 681

(Univ. of Minn. Press 1981) (explaining origin of self-incrimination).
8 See infra Section II, Parts B & C (describing changes that occurred throughoutl9th and
20th century).
9 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 283 (1936) (holding police violence when
obtaining confession violation of due process); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 240-42 (1940)
(finding police coercion when suspect confessed after confinement and constant police
questioning); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 156 (1944) (reversing murder convictions
based on confessions when confessions were result of violence and fear).
10384 U.S. 436 (1966).
11 See id.
471-72 (creating judicial safeguard and recognizing importance of these rights).
12 See Richardson, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 129 n.9 (identifying circuit split regarding definition of
"custodial" under Miranda).
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warrant, the "custodial" requirement is satisfied; however it is unclear
whether an individual placed in handcuffs during the execution of a search
warrant for officer safety is within the scope of custodial.13 There is a need
for clarity within this area because of the importance of the rights at stake;
however there is a compelling argument for police officers14to efficiently
perform their job duties without a complicated legal analysis.
This note will explore the confusing and inconsistent nature of the
law as it pertains to "custody" and how the courts attempt to define custody
within the requirements of Miranda.15 Beginning with a brief overview
and history of the rationale behind the right to remain silent and the right to
counsel, this note will then discuss the historical development of Miranda
and the current state of the law. 16 Then, current factual circumstances will
be presented that display how real life encounters are decided under the
current state of the law. 1 7 This note will then outline factors litigants are
required to show the court to determine whether an individual was in
custody to require Miranda warnings.18 Additionally, an analysis of the
current obstacles a litigant may face when defending an individual who
may have been in custody or a prosecutor arguing Miranda warnings are
not required.1 9 Finally, the varying tests will be compared to help guide the
litigant through the current state of the law and where it is likely going. 20
Other issues have been resolved within this area, like
"interrogation" which has been clearly defined for decades. 2 1 It is evident
"custody" under Miranda needs to be clarified for litigants and police
officers alike.22 This note will conclude with a prediction of the future of
the anticipated development of "custody" as it is related to Miranda and
advise litigants how to frame an argument to best serve the represented

party.23

13 Id.

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. (identifying complicated legal tests among circuits when determining custody).
infra Sections II, III.
infra Section II.
infra Section III.
infra Section IV.
infra Section IV.
infra Section IV
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1984) (analyzing interrogation within

Miranda context). The court defined "interrogation" for purposes of Miranda as any police
questioning, "initiated by law enforcement officers" after a suspect is placed under formal arrest
or "otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id.
22 See infra Section V.
23 See infra Section V.
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HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND SELF
INCRIMINATION

The current state of the law has evolved through hundreds of years
of judicial interpretation and statutory implementation.24 Opportunities
throughout history were presented to establish and protect these rights;
however, it has not been a swift process. 25 In 1897, in Bram v. United
26
States , the Court discussed the history and case law beginning in early
British and American history and laid down a rule that was not practically
enforced until the 2 0 th century; a rule that identified the requisite mental
state required to voluntarily make an admission. 2 The law had the intent
to preserve voluntariness of a confession, but the adoption of that rule did
not come to fruition until recently. 28
A. Early construction of the right to counsel and againstself-incrimination
The right to self-incrimination and the right to counsel were
indispensable to the founding fathers because of their experiences in
England involving police temptation to coerce individuals into false
confessions by torture.29 These experiences were based on 16 th century
England when an individual was considered guilty unless they swore their
innocence and any admission, despite the level of coercion, was

24 See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968) (overhauling Miranda and seeking streamline application
exclusion of evidence); see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). The Boyd
court illustrated that the founders knew "illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first
footing ... by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure." Id.; see
also Nathan Dorn, John Lilburne, Oaths and the Cruel Trilemma, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Apr.
25,
2013),
http://blogs.loc.gov/law/2013/04/j ohn-lilburne-oaths-and-the-cruel-trilemma
(describing forced oath that legally bound resulted in change in English law).
25 See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (describing Fifth Amendment as
binding). The Court identified the Fifth Amendment as the controlling body of law when dealing
with criminal trials and issues of police coercion and self-incrimination, but failing to apply the
rules practically. Id.; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461 (identifying issue as one which would have
been "settled in federal courts almost 70 years ago").
26 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897).
27 See id. at 549 (requiring "legal sufficiency" of suspect's admission considered voluntary
if not product of coercion).
28 See Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1924) (explaining fundamentals
of voluntary confession). The court excluded the defendant's statements because they were the
result of a seven day interrogation and held "confession[s] obtained by compulsion must be
excluded whatever may have been the character of the compulsion," regardless of the situation.
Id. at 14-15.
29 See AKHIL R. AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 329 (2006) (describing
self-incrimination history).
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admissible.30
This tradition continued in early American history despite the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.31
Initially, the Bill of Rights was only mandated by the federal government
32
and did not include the individual State sovereignty.
However, this
changed after the Civil War and the ratification of the Reconstruction
Amendments.33
B. Reconstruction Amendments
The post-Civil War amendments sought to unify the country.3 4
Through judicial interpretation, the courts construed the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate some of the provisions
within the Bill of Rights and impose these provisions on the States.35 The
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
seek to confer new rights on American citizens but apply existing rights
equally. 36
However, the "right" to self-incrimination was not automatically
guaranteed because it was considered part of the privileges and immunities
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. 3
In fact, the period after the
Twining v. New Jersey38 decision was known as "selective incorporation"
of provisions of the Bill of Rights. 39 This was the law for the next half
century until it was ultimately overruled by the Malloy court.4 0 After the
Malloy decision, an equal application of the right against self-incrimination

30 See GREAVES, supra note 7, at 649, 681 (1981)

(describing prevalence of coercive

environments).
31 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (providing courts with basis to impose rights contained
within Bill of Rights onto States).
32 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 745 (2010) (discussing exclusive Federal
Government application and how Civil War changed Federal policy).
33 See Robert L. Cord, The Incorporation Doctrine and ProceduralDue Process Under the
Fourteenth Amendment: An Overview, 1987 BYU. L. REV. 867, 870-75 (1987) (discussing
history of post-Civil War amendments and ratification).
34 Id.

3 Ild. at 870.
36 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 96 (1872) (Fields, J., dissenting) (identifying
purpose of clause limiting state- imposed restrictions upon citizens).
37 See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908) (holding Fourteenth Amendment does
not guarantee "privilege" against self-incrimination and can be curtailed).
211 U.S. 78 (1908).
39 Id. (noting denial of certain Constitutional rights may deprive individual of due process).
40 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (holding Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
States from intruding on federally protected rights, including self-incrimination).
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was to be applied nationwide. 4a After equal application of these important
Constitutional rights, before Federal and State became the law,
complications arose involving the execution of these new mandatory rights;
further analysis of the intricacies of those standards continued and led to
Miranda.a2
C. 20th Century Interpretationand Miranda
During the early 20th century there was a legal aid movement (a
social movement recognizing equal access to legal aid was severely
lacking) that ultimately led to a broader interpretation of certain rights in
criminal matters.4 3 The seminal cases during this "due process" revolution
include Gideon v. Wainwright,44 Mapp v. Ohio,45 Terry v. Ohio,46 and
Escobedo v. Illinois.a7 A shift in the judicial interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment resulted in certain statements inadmissible when they were the
result of police interrogation without prior reading of the suspect's rights.4 8
This particular movement was articulated in Mirandav. Arizona combining
multiple cases and created a landmark decision that remains highly
influential in this area of the law to this day. 49
Ernesto Miranda was arrested on March 13, 1963 at his home and
taken to a Phoenix police station. 50 The police did not advise Miranda that
he had a right to an attorney and interrogated him for two hours.5 1
Ultimately, the police obtained a signed confession to the rape.52 The
police never informed Miranda of his right to silence nor his right to
counsel. 5 In essence, the coercion resulted in a confession and denied
41 See id. at 12-14 (applying federal standard of right against self-incrimination in state court
cases).
42 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79 (determining Fifth Amendment requires police read
suspect their rights before questioning).
43 See Alissa P. Worden, et al., Article: A Patchwork of Policies: Justice, Due Process and
Public Defense Across American States, 74 ALB. L. REv. 1423, 1424 (2011) (noting "due
process" revolution of 1950s and 1960s and pivotal cases therein).
44 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
45 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
46 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
47 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
48 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79 (imposing judicial safeguard of pre-interrogation
warnings).
49 Id. at 491-99 (combining multiple cases due to "recurrent significance").
50 ld. at491.
51 ld. at 440, 491-92.
52 Ld.at 492.
53 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491-92 (holding suspect "not in any way apprised of his rights to
consult with an attorney").
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Miranda the right to remain silent; the confession also rendered his right to
counsel at trial ineffective because an admission is so damning.5 4 SThe
55
Court ultimately reversed the conviction based on the signed confession.
The other petitioners in the matter, Michael Vignera and Carl
Calvin Westover, were in similar situations as Miranda and the Court
reversed. 6 The Court also heard from petitioner, Roy Allen Stewart, and
affirmed the reversal of his convictions based on a similar theory.5 The
Miranda court imposed a judicial safeguard
that requires police read the
S • 58
suspect his rights prior to questioning.5
Additionally, if there is no
evidence that suggests the police provided the suspect with information
regarding his rights, it is presumed the defendant was not given the
opportunity to "intelligently" waive these essential rights.59
The Court determined an individual must waive these rights after
fully understanding them after the police informed them of those rights.60
The Court believed it was important for a defendant who waives his rights
to do so "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently" after notice of rights
has been given. 61 This important decision requires that an individual held
by police must be read their rights prior to any interrogation. 62
There have been many developments in the law over the course of
fifty years that have undermined Miranda.63 Specifically, Miranda was
criticized for being too broad and exceeding the protections provided by the

54 See id at 492 (examining how suspect's rights are affected by police coercion).
55 Id. at 492-93 (reversing based on suspect's lack of knowledge of rights and coercive police
methods).
56 See id. at 494-97 (identifying other suspects were not warned of their rights before
questioning).
57 See id. at 497-99 (holding Stewart was coerced based on nine interrogations over course of
five days).
58 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 498-99.
59 See id. (discussing presumption within context of custodial interrogation).
60 See id. at 479 ("After [Mirandawarnings are given] ...

the individual may knowingly and

intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement.") (emphasis
added).
61 See id. at 444 (requiring heightened mental state of suspect to waive these rights).
62 See id. at 471 ("Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation must be
clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him
during interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate today. As with the
warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything stated can be used in evidence against
him, this warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation.").
63 Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471 (excluding suspect's statements made prior to
warnings), with Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994) (holding subjective views of
suspect regarding "custody" does not factor in ultimate objective determination), and United
States v. Rivas-Lopez, 988 F. Supp. 1424, 1432 (D. Utah 1997) (identifying Miranda as
Constitutional "safeguard" and be issued as precaution rather than substantive Constitutional
right).
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Fifth Amendment. 64 Additionally, silence after issued Miranda warnings
was used to impeach the suspect.65 Miranda was frequently questioned to
determine whether the Constitution requires warnings or whether warnings
are simply judicial safeguards. 66
Miranda warnings are only required when a suspect is being
interrogated while in custody, however defining this has been difficult for
courts after the Miranda decision. The objective test courts utilized when
determining custody has created practical issues due to confusing legal
tests and inconsistent results. 6 8 Authority in other areas of criminal
procedure and constitutional rights has shifted toward "bright line" rules;
however, an objective test remains regarding custody for Miranda
purposes. 69
The current law objective test usually analyzes whether the suspect
has been placed under formal arrest or if the suspect is constructively under
arrest, generally meaning the individual would feel free to terminate the
encounter.70 A totality of the circumstances approach is generally taken
and some factors that are considered are: (1) where the interrogation took
place; (2) whether objective evidence of an arrest is present; and (3) the
length and substance of the police's questions.71 The tests are clear when
an individual is placed under formal arrest pursuant to probable cause;
however, there are many instances where an individual would not feel free

64 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1985) (identifying "presumption" of
compelled or coerced testimony and suggesting Miranda unnecessarily applied in many
circumstances).
65 See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-18 (1976) (holding suspect's silence after Miranda
warnings as "nothing more" than suspect invoking right).
66 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 (1984) (identifying purpose of warnings as
safeguards to protect suspects from confessing under police coercion); District Attorney's Office
v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 73 n.4 (2009) (examining prior case law and recognizing rights going
back centuries but not implementing until Miranda).
67 See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 110 (1995) (holding "in custody" for Miranda
requires factual and legal analysis); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (requiring
Miranda warnings when suspect under formal arrest or objectively believes detainment is formal
arrest).
68 See United States v. Richardson, 36 F. Supp. 3d 120, 129 n.9 (D.D.C. 2014) (describing
inconsistent case law throughout circuits on issue of custody).
69 See United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (4th Cir. 1995) (identifying Terry
stops do not sufficiently rise to level of formal arrest). But see United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d
659, 676 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding suspect who is not free to end encounter is under custody for
Mirandapurposes).
70 See Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 (identifying factors that must be considered when making
objective determination of custody).
71 See People v. Boyer, 768 P.2d 610, 622-23 (Cal. 1989) (introducing and analyzing factors
to determine custody but holding no one factor dispositive).
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72

to terminate the encounter.
Yet, the courts hold they are not in custody
for Miranda purposes; these situations give rise to the current controversy
within the current formulation of the law. 3
III. FACTS
The United States Supreme Court determined the analysis to
determine custody for Miranda purposes "is simply whether there is a
'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree
associated with a formal arrest."' v
Over the years, the Court has
determined that Miranda warnings are not required during a traffic stop.75
Anything in between however is up for debate, specifically when an
individual is placed in handcuffs during the execution of a search warrant
or for officer safety.76 Under the current law, similar factual situations can
have very different outcomes jurisdiction by jurisdiction.
Some circuits have determined that the custody requirement for
Miranda has been satisfied when a defendant is placed in handcuffs and
detained during the execution of a search warrant.
United States v.
Cowan7 9 in particular focuses primarily on the suspect's objective belief
whether they could end the encounter rather than the requirement the
restraint gives rise to formal arrest. 80 Other circuits reject this outright,
claiming that this does not rise to the requisite level of a "formal arrest.""
72

See Richardson, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 129 n.9 (describing confusing nature and vagueness of

custody law pertaining to Miranda).
73 Id.
74 See Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495
(1977)). (defining "custody" for purposes of Miranda).
75 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (categorizing traffic stops as Terry
stops not Mirandacustody).
76 See cases cited supra note 4 (discussing Mirandaand custodial interrogations).
77 Compare Richardson, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 120, 129 n.9 (declining to answer whether
handcuffs sufficiently place suspect in custody for Miranda), with United States v. Leshuk, 65
F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding "handcuffs do not necessarily rise to level of custody for
Miranda" purposes), and United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 675 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[A]
reasonable person finding himself placed in handcuffs by the police would ordinarily conclude..
• that he was restrained to a degree normally associated with formal arrest and, therefore, in
custody.").
78 See United States v. Cowan, 674 F.3d 947, 957 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding suspect was in
custody for Miranda purposes "because a reasonable person in [the defendant's] position would
not have felt free to end the questioning and leave.").
79 674 F.3d 947(8th Cir. 2012).
80 See id. at 957-58 (holding defendant was in custody when "detained, handcuffed, and
patted down while [police] questioned him"); cf. Beheler,463 U.S. at 1124 (identifying situations
where suspect's restraint is constructively formal arrest.
81 See United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (4th Cir. 1995) (concluding a number
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The Circuits unanimously hold that the use of handcuffs are a substantial
factor, but is not dispositive when determining custody. 12
A. D.C. Circuit
The D.C. Circuit has declined to elaborate on whether a handcuffed
detainee is within the definition of "custody" necessary to invoke
warnings.8 3 In United States v. Richardson8 4 court identified a number of
cases that have failed to answer this question. 5 The D.C. Circuit also
relies on Congress' identification that harmless error of police work should
be disregarded when deciding these Constitutional issues.8 6 The BrinsonScott Court identified that the main issue in dispute was whether
the
8
7
Miranda.
for
custody
constituted
detention
lawful
handcuffs and
Brinson-Scott's brother, Jonathan Cayol, was arrested for a number
of charges, and the police obtained a search warrant for Cayol's
apartment.88 At the time of the search, Brinson-Scott was the only
occupant of the apartment.8 9 The police placed Brinson-Scott in handcuffs
and placed him in a chair in the living room. 90 Police officers asked
Brinson-Scott a number of questions while handcuffed, specifically which
room belonged to Brinson-Scott, and he responded verbally and with a
head nod.91 When police entered the left room they discovered cocaine,

of factors, including weapon drawing, does not necessarily rise to Miranda custody). The Court
explained that an objective belief that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave, given the
circumstances, "does not necessarily transform a lawful Terry stop into a custodial interrogation
requiring Miranda warnings." Id. at 1109.
82 See id. (discussing relevance of police questioning when suspect is in police cars); United
States v. Brinson-Scott, 714 F.3d 616, 621 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (identifying handcuffs as relevant
factor pertaining during custody analysis).
83 See United States v. Richardson, 36 F. Supp. 3d 120, 129 n.9 (D.D.C. 2014) (identifying
D.C. Circuit's lack of clarity on issue of Miranda custody).
84 36 F. Supp. 3d 120,(D.D.C. 2014).
85 See id. (identifying Brinson-Scott, Harris, and Gaston cases not answering handcuff
custody question).
86 See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (allowing judgment when identified errors "do not affect the
substantial rights of the parties."); FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 52(a) (procedural rule that further defines
"harmless" and "plain" error within statute); United States v. Green, 254 F.3d 167, 170 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (holding police error harmless when not a contributing factor for conviction).
87 Brinson-Scott, 714 F.3d at 621.
88 See id. at 619 (stating search warrant executed to search for weapons after arrest for
unlawful possession of firearms).
89 Id.

90 See id. (explaining Brinson-Scott handcuffing was for officer safety during search).

91 See id. at 620 (stating defendant told police his room was toward right but nodded his head
toward left).
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92
cash, a protective facemask, and some of Brinson-Scott's personal items.
After the police discovered these items, Brinson-Scott was approached and
told police, "[they] don't know what it's like to grow up in this
neighborhood. What else are we supposed to do?" 93 This
statement was
94
introduced and identified by the court as his "confession."

Brinson-Scott was indicted for a number of charges and moved to
suppress all physical evidence seized from the apartment. 95 The court
denied these motions and Brinson-Scott was subsequently convicted on one
of the counts in the indictment. 96 Brinson-Scott then brought an appeal and
the court affirmed the lower court's decision. 97 The court first identified
the police's detention of the defendant was lawful under the Fourth
Amendment and that his "nod" was considered harmless error beyond a
reasonable doubt. 98 This court identified the complexities associated with
the detention of Brinson-Scott and whether it was "within the meaning of
Miranda" but took an alternate route provided by the substantial evidence
and avoided "this constitutional thicket." 99
Similarly, the Harris court dealt with the issue in a similar way.100
The defendant claimed the use of handcuffs and immediate questioning by
police officers violated her Fifth Amendment rights provided by
Miranda.""' Officers executed a search warrant on Harris's apartment, and
when they entered the apartment they handcuffed Harris and two others
inside. 10 2 Without providing Miranda warnings, the officers asked Harris
if there was anything in the apartment they should know about. 0 3 Harris

92

See Brinson-Scott, 714 F.3d at 619 (discussing police discovery of money and drugs).

93

Id.
94 See id.(denying suppression of physical evidence, statements, head nod and confession).
95 See id.(stating defendant was indicted on possession with intent to distribute cocaine and
possession). Specifically, the indictment was brought under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii)
and one count of possessing with intent to distribute powder cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(C)). Id.
96 See id.
(stating defendant was sentenced to 140 months' imprisonment).
97 See Brinson-Scott, 714 F.3d at 621-22 (discussing admission of Brinson-Scott's statement
and head nod).
98 Id. at 622.
99 ld. at 621-23; see Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of.").
100 See United States v. Harris, 515 F.3d 1307,1311 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (declining review on
custody issue within Miranda).
101 See id.at 1309 (stating defendant argues rights violated because subjected to custodial
interrogation without Miranda advisement).
102 See id. at 1309.
103 See id.
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informed the police of two guns in the bedroom and the police recovered
them.t °4 The police also found a large quantity of PCD that suggested
distribution. 10 5 Harris was indicted for a number of drug offenses and
motions were made to suppress statements regarding the guns. 10 6 The
district court held that Harris10 was not "in custody," and therefore not
entitled to Miranda warnings. 7
On appeal, the defendant claimed the conviction should be vacated
because her Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination were
violated. 08 The court ultimately declined to reach the question of whether
Harris was subjected to custodial interrogation based on similar reasoning
of other D.C. court rulings and relied on harmless error, but did identify the
Second Circuit "reasonable person" standard.1 09
The final case of importance within D.C. is United States v.
Gaston.110 A search warrant was issued based on confidential information
to search Gaston's row house. 1
During the execution of the search
warrant, ten to fifteen officers entered the home, handcuffed Gaston, and
subsequently interviewed him.1 12 Before the search began, police asked
Gaston for his personal information and whether he owned the house,
which he co-owned with his sisters. 113 Gaston was not provided his
Miranda warnings prior to giving these statements. 114 These statements
were subsequently offered at Gaston's trial and he was convicted for drug
trafficking offenses. 115
The court determined the Miranda custody issue was not necessary
to determine this case. 1 16 The court focused on the importance of
handcuffs in its analysis, but determined they were only one factor to

104 Id.

See Harris,515 F.3d at 1309.
Id.
107 Id.
108 See id. at 1311 (summarizing defendant's argument).
109 See id. (holding link between defendant's knowledge was minimal compared with amount
105

106

of physical evidence against defendant); see also United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 676 (2d.
Cir. 2004) (providing reasonable person would believe they were in custody when placed in
handcuffs).
110 357 F.3d 77 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
III See id. at 79 (stating ATF obtained reliable information providing basis for search
warrant).
112 Id. at 81.
113 See id.at 81-82.
114 See id. at 82.
115 See Gaston, 357 F.3dat 81-82.
116 See id. at 82 (relying on "administrative questioning" exemption under Miranda rather
than analyzing detention itself).
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consider. 117 Additionally, the court identified the test to be, would a
reasonable person understand the situation "to be comparable to a formal
arrest. '
Instead, the court categorized the substance of the interview as
"booking" rather than dealing with the overall question of custody, despite
the use of handcuffs and the presence of several police officers.1 1 9 The
court held this line of questioning was related to "administrative120concerns"
described in Muniz and identified this exception under Miranda.
Overall, the D.C. Circuit has failed to directly answer the question
thus far, however it has clearly identified that handcuffs alone are
insufficient to determine whether a detainee is in custody that satisfies the
requirements of Miranda.121 The D.C. Circuit identifies handcuffs as an
important factor that should be considered in the overall analysis, however
many cases that involve the use of handcuffs are decided on the basis of
inconsequential error or under an administrative exception. 122
B. The Circuits Outside of D.C.
Although the D.C. Circuit has failed to answer this question, other
circuits have taken various positions on either side when deciding the
handcuff issue during the execution of search warrants. 123 Some circuits
are in agreement that handcuffing a suspect does not automatically invoke
Miranda implications, while others hold that handcuffs rise to the requisite
level of formal arrest. 124
In the Fourth Circuit, the courts focus on an objective standard of
whether or not the detainee felt free to terminate the encounter rather than
117 See id. (addressing government's argument that handcuffing does not automatically
constitute custody).
118 See id.(finding custody is an objective standard).
119 See id.
120 See Gaston, 357 F.3d at 82; see also Pennsylvania v.Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601-02 (1990)

(allowing routine booking questions "reasonably related to administrative concerns" without prior
Miranda warnings).
121 See supra Section III.A (discussing D.C. circuit decisions with respect to handcuffed
detainees).
122 See United States v. Richardson, 36 F. Supp. 3d 120, 129 n.9 (D.D.C. 2014); see supra
Section 111(a).
123 Compare United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding threats
and heavy police presence does not automatically rise to custodial arrest for Miranda), with
United States v. Cowan, 674 F.3d 947, 957-58 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding defendant was in custody
when suspect reasonably believed they could not end the encounter), and United States v.
Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 676 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding reasonable person in handcuffs would not feel
free to leave, thus in custody).
124 See cases cited supra note 4 (describing varying jurisprudence among circuits on issue of
handcuffs).
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simply the subjective belief of the detainee. 125 Specifically, in United
States v. Leshuk, 126 the court dealt with a warrantless detainment, unlike the
other circuits, and reasoned that even a subjective belief does not
automatically elevate a detainment to the requisite level of custody for
Miranda. 127
Leshuk dealt with a turkey hunter who discovered a patch of
28
marijuana and ultimately located the three suspects, including Leshuk.1
The police officers identified themselves to the suspects, patted them down,
and one carried a firearm. 129
Police told the suspects they were
investigating nearby marijuana plants, and asked the suspects about the
contents of their belongings. 1" ° Throughout this interaction, the police
asked the suspects' various questions regarding their reasons for being at
the site and the bags, but the suspects either remained silent or denied
ownership of the bags.131 The defendants were eventually placed under
arrest, but at no time prior to their arrest were they informed of their
Miranda rights, which sparked this appeal. 132
The Leshuk court continued their analysis and named several
factors it considered important, but not enough to elevate a detainment to a
custodial arrest for Miranda purposes.133 These factors include drawing
weapons, the use of handcuffs on a suspect, placing the suspect in the
police car, heavy police presence and the threat of force; however these do
not automatically "elevate a lawful stop into a custodial arrest for Miranda
purposes." 1 4 Ultimately, the Court determined the requisite level of
custody for Miranda required more than a showing that the police
questioned the defendant prior to placing the defendant under formal

arrest.135
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit examines the conduct of the police, but

125

See Leshuk, 65 F.3d at 1109 (Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 318 (1994)) ("[The

detainee's] objective belief is important to the assessment of whether a stop is considered
custodial given that 'the initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances
of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or
the person being questioned.").
126 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995).
127 See Leshuk, 65 F.3d at 1109 (identifying subjective beliefs of detainee or police as
irrelevant in custody analysis).
128 Id.at 1106-07.
129 Id. at 1107. Neither of the officers were in uniform. Id.
130 Ild.
(identifying two backpacks near suspects and brown garbage bag).
131 Id.
132 Leshuk, 65 F.3d at 1107-08.
133 Id. at 1109-10.
134 Id.
135 Id.
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13 6
also other factors, such as the environment the detainment took place.
The Ninth Circuit requires Miranda warnings more broadly than other
courts, specifically requiring warnings during a Terry stop if the
questioning "takes place in a police dominated" location. 13 The courts in
this circuit conduct a thorough factual examination to determine objective
reasonableness. "'
United States v. Bautista 39 provides the clearest
example of how this issue is resolved
within the Ninth Circuit, but did
140
leave some factors "open to question."

The defendants in Bautista robbed a bank in Woodland Hills,
California. 141 Police issued a broadcast to local patrolmen describing the
bank robbers. 142 Two police officers heard the broadcast and matched the
description to Bautista and Martinez, who were found in close proximity to
the getaway vehicle. 143 The officers eventually stopped the individuals,
frisked them for weapons, and handcuffed them. 144
Police questioned the two suspects separately and asked questions
pertaining to their identity, the identity of the other detainee, the model and
make of the vehicle they were driving, the knowledge of the area, and who
they knew in the area. 145 Police considered the answers to these questions
"suspicious," and the answers conflicted with one another. 146 The two
claimed they did not know each other's names, who they were meeting, or
why they were in the area. 14 Police eventually informed the defendants
they were under arrest based on the separate interviews that took place. 141
136 See United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1292 (9th Cir. 1982) (identifying reasonable
person standard and other factors courts within circuit examine); see also United States v. Booth,
669 F.2d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[L]anguage used by the officer to summon the individual,
the extent to which he or she is confronted with evidence of guilt, the physical surroundings of
the interrogation, the duration of the detention and the degree of pressure applied to detain the
individual").
137 See Bautista, 684 F.2d at 1291 (requiring Miranda warnings during "police dominated"
atmospheres, but not required in all Terry stops).
138 See id. at 1292 (identifying factors, primarily conduct of police, and how it impacts
detainee).
139 684 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1982).
140 See id.at 1292 (analyzing initial stop, impact of handcuffs, length of detention and
validity of detainment). But see id. (questioning relevance of police confronting detainee with
evidence of guilt).
141 Id. at 1287.
142 ld. The broadcast described the robbers as being armed, of Mexican and Iranian descent,
and location of getaway vehicle. ld.
143 Id.
144 Bautista, 684 F.2d at 1287.
145

Id. at 1287-88.

146 Id.
147

Id.

148 Id. at 1288.
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On appeal, the Bautista court rejected claims regarding the failure
of police to issue Miranda warnings. 149 The court reasoned that the
defendants were not placed in custody and entitled to Miranda warnings
because "on-the-scene questioning", which allow police to gather
information, do not create a situation where Miranda warnings are
required, and being in handcuffs does not equate to being placed in custody
to constitute Miranda warnings. 50 Bautista described the "reasonable
person" standard used51in some circuits, but also explicitly examined the
conduct of the police. 1
The Eighth Circuit similarly relies upon the "objective reasonable
belief' that the detainee felt they could not end the encounter or that they
were restrained to the level of formal arrest, but also relies upon six nonexclusive factors. 152 Similar to the other circuits, this analysis requires an
in depth factual analysis. 153 The Griffin court initially identified the factors
the Eight Circuit relies on and discusses both a subjective and objective

analysis. 154
In Griffin, the defendants robbed a bank and the robbery was
subsequently investigated by the F.B.I. 155 The F.B.I. eventually obtained
information that linked Griffin to the crime, and they decided to speak to
him. 156 The F.B.I. set up a meeting with Griffin in his home and when the
officers arrived, Griffin told them at his front door that, "[t]he gun wasn't
loaded." 157
The agents spoke to Griffin privately in his home, did not draw
their guns or inform Griffin of his Miranda rights.1 58 However, the police
informed Griffin he was free to leave at anytime and that he was no under
149 Bautista, 684 F.2d at 1292.
150 See id. at 1291-92 (holding "on-the-scene questioning" does not create coercive
atmosphere, and handcuffs are not dispositive of custody).
151 See id.(citing United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1981)).
152 See United States v. Diaz, 736 F.3d 1143, 1148 (8th Cir. 2013) (identifying "six nonexclusive" factors courts rely upon to determine custody).
153 See United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1349-52 (8th Cir. 1990) (discussing lengthy
requirements imposed by courts nationwide and factors associated).
154 Id. The court notes its concern "with the suspect's subjective belief that 'his freedom of
action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest' and whether that belief is objectively
reasonable under the circumstances" thereby introducing a subjective and objective analysis. ld.
at 1349 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984))..
155 Id. at 1345.
156 See id.
at 1345-46 (detailing F.B.I. investigation linking Griffin and robbery).
157 Id. The purpose of this meeting was to determine what Griffin knew about the robbery,
and the police did not intend to arrest him at his home. Id. Griffin made his admission
immediately after the police identified the reason they were at his home, and his statement
regarding the gun implied his involvement in the robbery. ld.
158 Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1345-46.
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arrest. 159 The interview lasted two hours and at the end of the interview,
the agents arrested Griffin for his involvement in the robbery.160 Griffin
was eventually indicted161
on robbery and gun charges and conditionally pled
guilty to those charges.
Griffin identified the most "effective means" to determine custody
162
as whether the individual was actually informed of their formal arrest.
Additionally, formal notice to the defendant by the police is considered a
substantial factor to determine whether the suspect felt free to leave. 16'The
Griffin court then described a second factor, specifically, how restraint on
freedom of movement factors in to the custody determination. 164 This
court does identify that a detainee under "guard" by the police is more
indicate of formal arrest than not, but that it definitely impacts the
detainee's belief they cannot leave to some extent.165 Griffin goes on to
describe the other remaining factors, such as who initiated the contact, the
tactics the police used and who "dominated the interview" and presents
how lengthy the analysis can be and requires objective evidence to support
subjective beliefs of formal arrest. 166 Importantly, Griffin identified1 6that
police officers should issue Miranda warnings "as a matter of course." 7
United States v. Cowan 68 utilized the factors presented by Griffin
and found the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes because "a
reasonable person in Cowan's position would not have felt free to end the
questioning and leave."' 169 In Cowan, the police's conduct, which included
a frisk of the defendant and questioning without reading their rights,
elevated to custody for Miranda purposes. 170
159 Id.
160 Id. at 1346.

161 See id.(describing charges brought and Griffin's conditional plea). Specifically, Griffin
was indicted under and conditionally pled out to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d) for the crime of
robbery of a federally insured bank (Count I) and under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) for the use of a
firearm in relation to the robbery (Count III). Id.
162 See id. at 1349 (demonstrating suspect not in custody directly informing the suspect he is
not in custody). The court was clear that in general, when a suspect is informed that he is not
under arrest, there is not a finding of custody for Mirandapurposes. Id.
163 Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1350 (describing importance of informing suspect they are free and
they are not under arrest).
164 See id. (identifying importance of suspect's freedom of movement in situations where
Miranda custody is analyzed); see also Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (no
Mirandacustody when suspect was allowed free movement around his home).
165 Id. at 1350-51.
166

Id. at 1351-52.

167 See id.
at 1356 (reasoning police should issue warnings as a precautionary measure).
168 674 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 2012).
169 See id.
at 957 (determining custody for purposes of Miranda).
170 Id.
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Cowan dealt with a crack cocaine operation that officers believed
was operating between Davenport, Iowa and Chicago, Illinois. 1 71 During
police surveillance, the officers noticed individuals sitting in a vehicle
outside an apartment, and believed this vehicle was involved in the drug
operation. 172 Police eventually obtained a search warrant, searched the
apartment, and handcuffed Cowan. 173
Before the police searched the apartment, they frisked and
interviewed Cowan.174 Police told Cowan that he could leave if the car
outside the apartment was not his, however, police subsequently
determined he owned the car and arrested Cowan.175 Once he was under
arrest, police issued Miranda warnings for the first time, and Cowan made
incriminating statements. 176
On appeal, the court determined that Cowan was in custody for
Miranda purposes and relied upon the factors presented in Griffin. 177 The
court believed the interview of Cowan, while he was placed in cuffs in a
police dominated environment, required Miranda warnings. 1 7' The court
believed that, although the atmosphere where the interview takes place is
important, the critical question is "whether the defendant's freedom was
restricted in any way." 179
Recently, the Jarquin-Espinoza court questioned the current
application of the Griffin six-factor test within the Eighth Circuit. 8 0 The

171

Id. at 951.

172

See id. (describing apartment associated with Johnny Booth, who police believed was

involved with operation).
173 Cowan, 674 F.3d at 951. Police broke down the door to the apartment and entered to
serve the warrant. ld. While inside, the officers noticed several individuals, including Cowan.
ld. Cowan was eventually handcuffed. ld.
174 ld. Detectives patted down Cowan and asked him questions regarding his identification
and how he came to the apartment. ld. Cowan told police he took a bus from Chicago, however
police discovered Cowan had keys on him and the police suspected Cowan was lying to them. ld.
175 ld. Police informed Cowan that if the car did not belong to him, that he was free to leave.
Id. The keys they obtained from Cowan matched the vehicle outside the apartment and the police
used drug-sniffing dogs during their search of the vehicle, ld. The dogs and the officers
eventually discovered crack cocaine in Cowan's car. ld.
176 See id. at 951-52 (describing Cowan's incriminating responses, specifically that he drove
drugs from Chicago to Davenport).
177 See id. at 957 (citing United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir. 1990)).
171 See id. at 957-58 (holding no reasonable person in Cowan's position would have felt free
terminating encounter and ending questioning).
179 lo. at 957 (analyzing Cowan's detainment under Griffin and Martinez); see also United
States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 909 (holding reasonable person would not feel free leaving
questioning when handcuffed and questioned by police).
180 See United States v. Jarquin-Espinoza, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2759 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 9,
2015) (identifying courts within jurisdiction regularly rely on Griffin factors but not all factors
always present).
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court identified the six-factors from Griffin and discussed the deficiencies
with the test.181 The Jarquin-Espinozacourt went on to analyze the factors

set forth in Griffin and analyzed each factor independently. 18 2 The court
ultimately identified that determining custody "is more complicated than
simply tallying up the six Griffin factors, it must
be noted that five of the
183

factors weigh in favor of a finding of custody."
The Second Circuit has a more focused approach to determining
custody for Miranda purposes. 1 84 United States v. Newton' 85 is one of the
more recent cases that heavily considers whether handcuffs were used and
describes other courts that suggests handcuffs may be a dispositive
factor. 186 Newton held that the defendant was in custody for Miranda
18
purposes, notwithstanding specific advice that he was not under arrest. 7
Factually, the Newton court dealt with an individual who had an
extensive criminal history.188 Officers received information that the
defendant had threatened to kill his mother and her husband.1 89 This
information resulted in the police conducting a "safety search" of the
apartment where Newton and his mother resided. 190

181

See id. at *12-13("The first three factors tend to mitigate the existence of custody at the

time of questioning, while the remaining three factors tend to aggravate the existence of
custody.").
182 See id. at *21-24 (analyzing six-factor test set forth in Griffin in detail). The court
separated the first three factors (whether suspect was informed they were free to leave, whether
suspect was unrestrained and whether the suspect initiated contact) as factors that "mitigate" the
existence of custody during questioning. Id. at *13. The court then identified the last three
factors (whether strong arm tactics were used, atmosphere was police dominated, and whether
suspect was under arrest at the end of questioning) as factors that tend to aggravate the existence
of custody. ld. The court believed that "affirmative answers" to the final three questions would
suggest the suspect was in custody for Mirandapurposes. ld.
183 See id. at *24 (identifying majority of Griffin factors suggest suspect was in custody for
Miranda).
184 See United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 676 (2d Cir. 2004) (identifying reasonable
belief that handcuffs equal custody for Mirandapurposes).
185 369 F.3d 659 (2d Cir. 2004).
186 See id. at 676 (identifying handcuffs as "hallmark of formal arrest"). The court also
discussed the implications handcuffs have on the reasonable person's perception of freedom. ld.
187 See id. (recognizing police informing Newton he was not under arrest). The court
however limited the relevance because he was placed in handcuffs and not free to move. ld.
188 See id. at 663 (recounting Sewn Newton's criminal history, including three prior felony
convictions).
189 Newton, 369 F.3d at 663. The police obtained this information by telephone from a social
worker who represented a victim services organization. Id. The social worker had recently
communicated with Newton's mother, discovered the threats Newton made, and informed the
police immediately. ld. Newton's mother also informed the social worker that her son kept a
firearm in a shoebox near the front door of her home. Id.
190 Newton, 369 F.3d at 663. Police were also advised by their supervisors to arrest Newton
immediately based on a potential parole violation if a gun was found within the apartment. Id.
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Six officers, three parole officers and three police, arrived at the
apartment around 8:00 a.m. and were greeted by Newton wearing only his
underwear.1 91 A parole officer immediately told Newton to go into the
hallway where he proceeded to place him into handcuffs without reading
his Miranda rights.1 92 The officer did inform Newton that his was not
under arrest and the handcuffs were only a safety measure.1 93 The officers
eventually brought Newton into the apartment from the hallway, and began
asking him questions. 194 As a result of the police's questioning and
ultimate discovery
of a firearm, Newton was placed under arrest for
195
violating parole.
The Newton court "conclude[d] that a reasonable person would
have understood that his interrogation was being conducted pursuant to
arrest-like restraints." 196 The Newton court relied on the "free-to-leave"
inquiry and considered the level of restriction on freedom. 197 The "free-toleave" test is adopted and approved of in many jurisdictions, but the
practical application of the test is difficult to apply. 198
The circuits unanimously identify handcuffs as an important factor
in the analysis of whether a detainment rises to the requisite level of
custody to require Miranda warnings.1 99 Additionally, all of the circuits
rely on whether the suspect feels free to leave, but that determination
invites varying analysis that has been interpreted in a multitude of ways. 200

191 Id.
192 Id.

193 See id.(describing conversation between Officer Barry Davis and Newton).
194 ld. Police asked Newton a series of questions, including the location of his mother and
girlfriend and whether he had contraband in the apartment. ld. Newton responded that the only
contraband in the house was "only what is in the box" and made a gesture towards a shoebox. ld.
at 663-64. The shoebox contained an unloaded .22 automatic weapon and "a fully loaded
magazine." ld. at 664.
195 Newton, 369 F.3d 663.
196

Id. at 677.

197 ld. at 672 (identifying "free-to-leave" inquiry as "whether reasonable person would
believe they were not free" to end encounter).
198 See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988) (identifying court's approval of
"free-to-leave" inquiry). The court also acknowledged that police may make their own objective
determinations of whether the suspect is free to end the encounter. Id.; see also Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984) (identifying Miranda application usually applies only
when suspect objectively felt they were under formal arrest).
199 See supra Section III (describing different approaches by circuits that unanimously
identify handcuffs as important factor).
200 See supra Section III (explaining different interpretations of whether a suspect feels free
to leave between different circuits).
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IV. ANALYSIS

The past fifty plus years gave rise to the much-needed prohibition
of coercion of statements through Miranda, but with that, came the
confusing and complex application of those rights. 20 1 The media is
certainly partly to blame for how individual American citizens know when
and how to enact their rights, but should it be left solely to the individual
to
20 2
protect their own rights or should these rights be protected at all times?
The confusing nature of these various tests presents a difficult
conundrum for litigators in cases like these, especially for the defense to
show objective factual support. 20 3 Requiring a multitude of factors to
satisfy "custody" to preserve the right against self-incrimination runs the
risk of making it too difficult for detainees to obtain these rights and
implies the detainees should be more aware of the situation they are in and
invariably refuse to speak to police.20 4
For the past 100 years, the government has had the advantage in
these cases. 20° Police could do whatever they wanted; it was a wild west of
206
sorts, until the twentieth century when courts began clamping down.
The advantage was reduced during the Miranda era; however, the
government still maintained the advantage because the right against selfincrimination and right to counsel could only be invoked in a "formal
arrest. 2 °7 Litigants can still make that argument, that it is not the police's
job to preserve these rights, but instead the responsibility of the detainee to

201

time).
202

See supra Section II (presenting history of Miranda protections and the evolution over
See supra Section II (describing intimidation during detention because of police presence

and questioning).
203 Compare United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding reasonable
person would understand interrogation while handcuffed during restraint), and United States v.
Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding suspect, while in his home, was under custodial
environment and required Miranda warnings), with United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th
Cir. 1995) (holding suspect placed in police car for questioning and threatened with force does
not necessarily constitute custody for Miranda).
204 See Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1349 (explaining a lengthy six-part factual analysis required
when determining custody for Mirandapurposes).
205 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 446-50 (1966) (identifying physical and
psychological advantages police utilize when obtaining confessions).
206 See cases cited supra note 8 (describing evolution in jurisprudence towards individual
rights prior to Miranda).
207 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 434 (1984) (holding suspect entitled to judicial
safeguards under Miranda). The court further specified that these safeguards apply "regardless of
the nature or severity of the offense of which he is suspected or for which he was arrested." Id.
(emphasis added).
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affirmatively invoke these protections.20 8 Conversely, the government
should not be required to go through unnecessary and burdensome steps
while protecting communities from criminals.20 9
The multi-factor objective test requires a lengthy factual analysis
and it is questionable for multiple reasons. 2 1 First, police officers are
usually not lawyers and do not have the time to analyze the facts through a
multiple step test to determine whether Miranda warnings should be
given.
Second, recent cases related to police authority and individual
rights have seen the creation and rise of bright-line rules. 212 For example,
bright-line rules in other areas of procedure allows the individual defendant
notice of what to expect and allows the police to carry on their duties after
a few short sentences.2 3
The reasonable person standard from Newton presents a similar
factual analysis that may be too complicated for police officers to follow
during the course of their job and interactions with suspects. 214
Additionally, requiring police officers to determine reasonableness on the
job may be too burdensome on a daily basis.2 15 More importantly,

208

Compare Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994)

(requiring suspect

unambiguously invoke his Miranda rights), with Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)
(identifying paperwork explicitly waiving Mirandarights).
209 See Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring police inform all suspects who are formally
arrested of Constitutional rights going forward).
210 See United States v. Griffin, 922 F.3d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir. 1990) (identifying lengthy sixfactor test for determining custody). Griffin likely presented these six factors to aid police and
litigants to help determine when a suspect is in custody for Miranda. See id. at 1349-52
(spending a significant amount of time dissecting the issues and the factors). However,
implementing a legal test that includes six factors requires a substantial amount of legal resources
and may be difficult for police in determining when rights are required. See id.(questioning why
police did not just issue warnings at outset).
211 See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 154-55 (1990) (identifying advantages of
"bright-line" rules).
212 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (establishing bright-line rule for
juvenile capital punishment under Eight Amendment); Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 107
(Pa. 2014) (identifying bright-line rule allowing police search vehicle supported by probable
cause).
213 Compare Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 (establishing bright-line rule that Eighth Amendment
forbids imposition of death penalty on minors), and Gary, 91 A.3d at 107 (explaining
"automobile exception" warrant requirement allowing police officers search vehicle with
probable cause ), with Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1354 (identifying objective multi-factor test, which is
devoid of "bright-line," when determining Mirandacustody).
214 See United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659 (2d Cir. 2004) (describing reasonable person
standard and associated factors determine custody). The test requires an assessment of the
situation to determine whether the suspect would reasonably feel free to leave and whether there
were indications to the defendant that he had the opportunity to leave. Id.at 669.
215 See Newton, 369 F.3d at 669 (describing lack of clear guidance on custody issue under
Miranda). It may be unreasonable to expect police to understand the "in custody" indicia under
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litigating whether a detainee was in custody under the free-will test is
costly and requires a lengthy analysis. 216 There has been indication from
courts that police should read Miranda warnings to any suspect that is
detained as a matter of course. 217
Some litigants are automatically at a disadvantage because some
courts flat out reject handcuffs as placing the suspect in Miranda custody
without other supporting evidence. 21 8 The facts of Bautista for example,
under the Newton test may have produced a different result. 2 9 This is the
conundrum litigants and suspects throughout the country are presented
with, inconsistent rulings on important constitutional protections. 220
Barring a bright-line rule requiring all suspects detained by police be read
their rights, all circuits should hold the use of handcuffs renders a detainee
unable to end the encounter with police.221
The D.C. Circuit has been particularly unhelpful in this area; they
simply refuse to side one-way or the other on the issue.222 The circuit's
refusal to analyze custody under Miranda may suggest the issue is too
complex for an appellate court to venture into and are deferring to the
Supreme Court to hear the issue. 2 23 A valid question for this court, and
others that do not feel handcuffs restrain liberty under Miranda is, how can
a police officer
or detainee understand the law if the courts refuse to
24
explain it?

2

Miranda, if there is no "bright-line" rule on the subject. Id.
216 See id. at 669 (presenting several factors required for showing custody for Miranda
purposes).
217 Id.
218 See United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1292 (9th Cir. 1982) (identifying use of
handcuffs outside of formal arrest, for example for office safety).
219 Compare id. (holding suspect was not in custody despite being handcuffed), with Newton,
369 F.3d at 669 (holding suspect in custody for Mirandapurposes because he was handcuffed).
220 See United States v. Richardson, 36 F.Supp. 3d 120, 129 n.9 (D.D.C. 2014) (identifying
similar factual circumstances resulting in stark differences throughout the country).
221 See Newton, 369 F.3d at 669 (holding no reasonable person would believe use of
handcuffs allows them to end encounter with police).
222 See United States v. Brinson-Scott, 714 F.3d 616, 622-23 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (deciding case
under minor police error exception custody under Miranda); United States v. Gaston, 357 F.3d
77, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (utilizing administrative exemption under Miranda rather than analyzing
custody of suspect).
223 See Gaston, 357 F.3d at 82 (identifying authority in other circuits that would resolve
custody question, but deciding under another doctrine).
224 See Brinson-Scott, 714 F.3d at 621 (refusing answering Miranda custody question
because simpler alternatives existed).
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CONCLUSION

It is inevitable that the circuits will split on the application of
different legal principles based on geographical politics, philosophical
beliefs, and jurisprudence. However, the circuits should be unified on
essential constitutional rights, such as the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
The current state of the law with respect to Miranda protections is
unevenly applied and these constitutional protections vary based on
geography. Constitutional protections in other areas have been evenly
applied and that equal application must extend into this area. The rationale
for the Fourth and Fifth Amendments is derived from the prohibition of
police coercion. These varied legal tests and analyses create opportunities
for the police to potentially coerce individuals because they are not
required to provide Miranda warnings in circumstances where suspects are
handcuffed. A bright-line rule requiring the police to inform handcuffed
suspects in all instances of their Miranda rights would preserve individual
liberties and prohibit police from unnecessary coercion.
JonathanD. Blanton

